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Article: |
Middle Eastern Terrorism after Assad: Hope for a Change |
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Author: |
Dr. Ely Karmon |
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Date: |
June 2000 |
(As appeared on June 25, 2000 in ICT)
For
three decades Hafez el-Assad was a fierce enemy of not only Israel but of all
who stood in his way towards the creation of Greater Syria and the role he
envisioned for himself in the Arab world. Terror inside and terrorism abroad
were justifiable tools in his quest for dominance.
Assad
was the architect of the war of attrition on the water issue and the main
supporter of the Palestinian terrorism that led to the Six-Day War and the Arab
defeat. He was responsible for the death of thousands of Christians in Lebanon;
the assassination of the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and the Christian leader
Bashir Gemayel, which wiped out any meaningful resistance of the Lebanese
leadership to Syrian control; the massacre and expulsion of thousands of
Palestinians and their leader Arafat from northern Lebanon; and even the killing
of scores of Hizballah fighters who tried to limit Syrian control of their
neighborhood in Beirut. The fact that over 20,000 thousand Syrian Muslim
Brothers were killed by his artillery in the city of Hamah can well testify as
to Assad's ruthlessness.
All,
without exception, of the Palestinian groups and organizations opposed to Arafat
and the peace process have headquarters in Syria and bases in areas under Syrian
control in Lebanon.
Assad
has for years used terrorism too in his strategy to pressure Turkey to accede to
his claims for more water from his neighbor country. The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)
has been the tool for obtaining this goal, turning southeast Turkey into one of
the deadliest arenas for terrorist and guerrilla attacks.
Although
Iran is commonly considered the main sponsor of Middle Eastern terrorism in the
80s and 90s and the staunchest enemy of the peace process between Arabs and
Israel, it could not play such a role without the active and passive support of
Assad. The grooming of the Hizballah as a terrorist organization, the
establishment of the Revolutionary Guards' training camps in the Beqa' Valley,
the murderous attacks on the US embassy, US Marines and French peace-keeping
forces in Beirut, and more recently the massive weapons supply to the Hizballah
through Syrian territory testify to the pivotal role Syria has played in Iranian
sponsorship of international terrorism. Not long ago Mustafa Tlass, the Syrian
defense minister - who recently assured Bashar al-Assad of the army's allegiance
to his rule - admitted that he personally gave the green light to "The
Resistance" to bomb the American and French troops in Beirut in 1983.
Hizballah
considers itself - and is seen in the Arab world, as well as in Israel - as the
big winner in the fight against the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, an
example for the future behavior of the Palestinians vis-a-vis Israel. But any
objective observer could assess that Israel was compelled to withdraw, not by
400 - 500 Hizballah guerrillas - no real match for the IDF. Rather the
withdrawal came about because of the trepidation of Israeli political leaders to
tackle the real culprit: the Assad regime and its army, which granted Hizballah
practical immunity and vital strategic depth.
Before
Assad's death most observers and intelligence specialists estimated that he and
Iran would goad Hizballah to continue the guerrilla and terrorist war of
attrition against Israel's northern border, most probably with the support of,
or under the cover of, disenchanted Palestinian refugees.
After
Assad's death the Hizballah leaders can dream of a more independent status and a
predominant role in the Lebanese and Middle Eastern arena. It is perhaps
significant that Hizballah's Secretary-General Nasrallah was among the first
leaders to be received by the mourning Bashar. His delegation was received with
honors at the funeral and his troops were the only foreign ones permitted to
mourn Assad's death by marching in the city of Latakye.
Will
Bashar al-Assad and the military pillars of his regime continue the strategy
indicated by the father, as they solemnly promised during the first days of
mourning? Will Bashar continue to use terrorism as a strategic weapon in order
to show that he is not betraying his father's legacy, that he is as ruthless and
as formidable to his enemies as his father is?
The
real legacy left by President Assad should not be forgotten. The real stake is
not the stability of Bashar's regime but the eradication of terrorism as a
legitimate weapon in Middle Eastern politics. To contribute to the stability of
a regime "a la Hafez al-Assad" means to continue the oppression of the
Syrian people and to perpetuate the instability of the Middle East. Would it be
acceptable today to strive for the stability of the Khamene'i regime in Iran
rather than Khatami's reforms and the liberalization of the Iranian people?
The
absence from the funeral of most of the world's political leaders, including
president Putin of Russia, should be a sign to the young Assad that a new era is
dawning, and that what was tolerated for years by the international community
cannot continue. There are steps that Bashar el-Assad can take to adjust to this
new era:
First,
Hizballah's prevalence and radicalism in the Lebanese internal power balance,
with all its negative influence on the other communities and on the peace
process, should be curtailed, by disarming without delay the only active militia
left in the country. Otherwise we will see the territory now under Hizballah
control in Southern Lebanon - what Israeli commentator Ehud Ya'ari calls "Hizballahstan"
- become a new base for Jihad, both in Palestine and perhaps elsewhere in the
Middle East.
Second,
Lebanon and Syria should be influenced to put an end to the Iranian military
presence in the Beqa' Valley. The Revolutionary Guards are not only the
supporters of the Hizballah. They are also the agents of the hard-line circles
of the Iranian regime, who may use their the Hizballah to sabotage president
Khatemi's cautious steps of rapprochement to the U.S., the West and the peace
process through terrorist provocations.
Finally,
the new leadership in Syria should be made to understand, through the statements
and actions of Israeli and world leaders that its full acceptance in the new
Middle East is not without price. If Syria aspires to stabilize the regime, to
improve its economy, to enhance its relations with the outside world - and if it
genuinely intends to resume the peace talks - it must abandon once and for all
the use of terrorism in advancing its strategic and political goals.
Ely
Karmon
is a Senior Research Scholar and Director of the Internet Project of The
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at The Interdisciplinary
Center, Herzliya, Israel.
© Copyright 1997-2004 United States Committee For A Free Lebanon. All rights reserved.
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