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Article: |
Speech of Rector Selim Abou s.j regarding Syria's Occupation of Lebanon on the occasion of the patronal celebration of St Joseph's University |
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Author: |
Rector Selim Abou s.j |
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Date: |
March 2001 |
Ladies and Gentlemen of the faculty
Ladies and Gentlemen of the administrative personnel
Ladies and Gentlemen representatives of the student body
Dear Friends
In his introduction to a book on multi-communitarian societies by philosopher Charles Taylor, Amy Gutmann defines one of the primary civic tasks of any university as follows: “Members of academic communities, faculty, students and administrators, can use our rights to free speech to denounce disrespectable speech by exposing it for what it is, flagrant disregard for the interests of other people, rationalization of self-interest or group interest, prejudice, or sheer hatred of humanity.”[1]
Among the discourse that our academic community is asked to
denounce, I dwell today on that which seeks to justify Syrian control over
Lebanon, which the vast majority of the population cannot bear any longer. It
may be that the Syrian army finally withdraws to the Bekaa Valley, ─
albeit, one should note, eight years behind schedule. But it is not so much the
physical presence of this army which wounds the dignity of the Lebanese, as the
symbol of domination which it represents, and the effective domination which its
intelligence apparatus exercises over all sectors of public life. This Syrian
control is not about to be relaxed, and there will be no dearth of Lebanese
sycophants to laud its alleged benefits in a discourse which reflects a true
culture of servility and which, therefore, belongs to the category of
disrespectable speech.
To denounce this discourse is not to simply summarize its
content in order to rebut it, but as Amy Gutmann says, “to expose it for what
it is,” i.e. to reveal the form and degree of harm that it carries. Whether it
belongs to the langue-de-bois, to
double speak or logomachy; whether it is uttered by political officers,
religious personalities or party leaders; whether it is motivated by pragmatism,
opportunism or fear, this discourse is of a nature which in part undermines
social relations, destabilizes the nation and discredits the state, and for the
other part accelerates the migratory hemorrhage which is emptying Lebanon of its
young elite, who have become convinced that the country does not belong to them
any longer.
It is the sudden emergence of a liberated political
discourse calling for the redefinition of relations between Lebanon and Syria,
for the real independence of Lebanon, and for national dialogue, which has
unleashed irrational, contradictory or passionate speech which seeks to justify,
sometimes even to celebrate, the effective political and economic subservience
of the country. It is therefore necessary to dwell on the circumstances which
have made possible the emancipation of Lebanese political language, before we
proceed to a brief typology of disrespectable speech that pretends to enslave it
again, and thereafter to appreciate the highly damaging effect such speech
exercises on society, nation and state.
Liberation of
political language
Ten years were necessary before the tongues unwound and
freed themselves from coded language, that is from periphrases, metaphors,
metonymies and other figures of speech under which was expressed the increasing
unease caused by the presence of the Syrian army on the whole of Lebanese
territory and the intervention of its intelligence apparatus in all the fields
of social, political and economic life. Two events have operated as a prelude to
the change of linguistic behaviour in the course of the summer of 2000: the
withdrawal of the Israeli army from South Lebanon has come as a heavy argument
against the presence of the Syrian army over the whole territory, a presence
which could no longer be justified, if ever it could be, and the access to power
in Damascus of a young president, raising hopes for the liberalization of the
Syrian regime, and consequently, for a substantial modification of its policy in
Lebanon. But neither the dominant nor the Satellite State wished to understand
it in this way. Their combined intelligence apparatus was finishing preparing
– with manipulations, pressure and threats – an election which was vitiated
from the beginning by absurd electoral gerrymandering, in order to allow the
formation of a monochromatic Parliament which is totally subservient to Syria,
and to shut down any opposition. In the course of that strategy, however, they
forgot that an excess of repression leads, sooner or later, to the reaction of
freedom seekers. Thus the opposition landslide, in Beirut and in the Mountain.
And as tongues unwound, they did so for better and for worse.
Christian discourse against Syrian domination is not new
– as in the case of the Taef Agreement, it is ten years old. But it was made
explicit, structured, and was amplified to give birth, on 20 September 2000, to
the Declaration of the Assembly of Maronite bishops. Until that date, Christian
discourse resounded like a voice in the wilderness, and it was not difficult for
Syria to neutralize it. It was enough in order to do so to marginalise the
turbulent Christian community, which Syria had already decapitated by preventing
it from any authentic representation in power. It was then, thanks to the
electoral campaign and its unexpected results, that the discourse against Syrian
domination crossed the boundaries of the Christian community, and that a wind of
panic blew beyond Lebanon's frontiers. The taboo was broken. The Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt took on board most of the Christian requests and called for
national unity. As Issa Ghorayeb commented in his editorial on 15 September,
“Walid Jumblatt appears today as an ice-breaker, a bulldozer, a minesweeper,
behind whom one already sees other free thinkers rallying more or less
resolutely.”[2] For Syria and its
supporters, that was not acceptable, because Walid Jumblatt is a considerable
political leader, because he is Druze, and because during the war he had fought
the very Christians with whom he was now allying himself. There followed the unleashing against him of a
discourse of hatred and death threats, which is the extreme form of
disrespectable speech, its most despicable form indeed.
The ideological
discourse and logomachy
In present day Lebanon, one can distinguish three types of
disrespectable speech. The first is the ideological
discourse of so-called “national” parties, for whom the nation of
reference is not the Lebanese nation. Rather, reference is either to a mythical
“Syrian nation” or “the large Syria”, which is supposed to absorb
Lebanon, and, in due course, Jordan and Palestine, or to a utopian “Arab
nation” which is even larger, and which has no other point of reference than
the nostalgia, slightly secularized, of the Caliphate. These parties, which were
marginalized in the past by the mere operation of the democratic game, occupy at
present key positions in the Administration and are, occasionally, the preferred
bearers of Syrian messages to the frustrated Lebanese. It is one of these
parties which takes pride in having organized, in September 1982, the
assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel; it is the member of another
party, of similar lineage, who, on November 6, 2000, in the fullness of a
parliamentary session, responded to the reasoned and serene speech of the Druze
leader with a litany of curses and his death threat.
It happens that I had denounced, in my previous speeches,
unionist, totalitarian and ethnicising ideologies which were anchored in
language, or in religion, or in some alleged “natural” geography, ─
and promoted by Arab nationalists, irrespective of the party they belong to.
Walid Jumblatt is more explicit and more incisive: “In my mind, these parties
which have ideologies based on what is called the Syrian nation or the Arab
nation, these parties with old, frozen ideologies with a racial character, are
obsolete… In my mind, there is no Syrian nation or Arab nation. There is a
vast Arab culture, Christian and Muslim, which goes back several centuries.”[3]
Pan-Syrian or pan-Arab speech belongs formally to pure
phraseology, when it does not fall into logomachy.
This is the case, for instance, when the holders of this type of discourse
insist that sending the army to the Southern border is rendering a service to
Israel, and stay mute when they are told that the Syrian army stationed in the
Golan would in this logic be serving the interests of the enemy. This is also
the case when they declare that the Syrian army is present in Lebanon to defend
this country against Israeli aggression and stay coy when asked of one single
instance in which Syria protected Lebanon from Israeli bombardments. This is
equally the case when they make accusations of collusion with the enemy or with
a foreign power supportive of Israel against any person or group which rejects
Syrian hegemony and asks for the real independence of Lebanon, or when they
affirm that these demands fan the flame of confessional and sectarian drives,
and so on. What is deplorable is that these assertions are often reinforced by
similar official declarations, when they aren’t are simple repetitions
thereof.
But the specific vocation of the ideological discourse is
to boast of the immense services rendered to the Lebanese by Syria and its army.
Did Syria not fly to the rescue of the Christians, in 1976, at a moment when
they were running the risk of being destroyed by their Muslim adversaries ? Did
it not put an end to the fratricidal war and reestablish civil peace in the
country ? Did it not spill the blood of its soldiers to allow Lebanon to live
again ? This litany of counter-truths, which was taken on by the arrogant Syrian
minister of the information on the occasion of a visit to Lebanon, found its
sharp refutation under the pen of Ghassan Tueini.[4]
After reminding the minister that it was not the Lebanese Muslims but the
Palestinians, who had been armed by Syria, who in 1976, threatened Christians
with annihilation, he denounced, with several illustrations, the cynic and cruel
character of Syria's intervention throughout the war of Lebanon, and ended by
suggesting to the passing Minister that he close that file which does not honour
his country.
Constrained
discourse and double speak
The second type of disrespectable speech is characterized
by double speak, the one which is
expressed in private, and the one which is uttered in public. In private, one
complains of living in a satellite country, occupied and exploited; in public
one expresses one's glee in experiencing an osmosis between two countries which
share the same destiny. Last July, Thomas L. Friedman could still write in the New
York Times: “The number of Lebanese politicians, statesmen or writers
today who will dare to articulate a distinctly Lebanese national interest,
position or vision of the future – independent of Syrian interests – is
lower than ever.”[5]
But the speech held in public is of two types: it is a constrained discourse, motivated by fear or apprehension, or an accommodating
discourse, which is dictated by opportunism. Among the latter variations, on
finds the most subtle and the grossest, and no social group is spared. Among the
former, it would be wrong to think that it is always held under the sway of a
foreign, more or less explicit, threat; rather, and more probably, it comes as
the effect of an internalization of the repression: “Sixteen years ago, the
Syrian occupation of Lebanon was on the streets ─ Syrian checkpoints,
soldiers and tanks. That has largely disappeared. But that's because the Syrian
occupation has moved from the streets into the heads of the Lebanese. As the
world has looked away, Lebanon has increasingly become a Syrian province.”[6]
It is hard to know to what extent the pleadings of Muslim
religious authorities in favor of the Syrian presence in Lebanon corresponds to
their deeper convictions; one only knows that Syria and its agents exercise a
particularly severe pressure on the representatives of the community in general.
What is certain however, is that double speak splits here into two opposed
discourses which are foreign to each another, public discourse held by the
hierarchy, which is favorable to Syrian presence, and the private discourse of
the majority of the people, which is opposed to it. What happened is that the
latter has ceased to be clandestine and has expressed itself openly. For
instance the response of the Sunni and Shi‘i muftis to the Bkerké Declaration
has provoked two strong responses, under the form of two articles which are
equally significant, though unequal in length. In a column entitled “between
the Patriarch, the Mufti and Syria”, a Sunni from Tripoli, who is a doctor in
orientation psychology, addressed the religious head of the community in the
following terms: “The position of Patriarch Sfeir is wise and expresses the
opinion of all Lebanese, with the exception of the sycophants, the profiteers,
the liars and the weak-minded. As for you, Mr. Mufti, you have spoken in your
personal name, and not in the name of the Muslims or the Lebanese. Let your
heart speak, even if your fatwas have been dictated by the brothers.
I invite you to get down from your car in the souks and neighborhoods of
Tripoli, Saida, Beirut and Baalbeck, so that you see with your own eyes and hear
with your own ears the complaint that your brothers in faith, in religion, in
community and in nation raise against the military and economic presence of the
Syrians. In this day of September 2000, I have spoken the truth, and for that
very act, I fear no one’s accusation.”[7]
In a long article under the title “About which dialogue
and about which national reconciliation is one talking?”, Saoud al-Maoula,
member of the National Committee for Islamic-Christian dialogue, puts his ideas
at a more general, more comprehensive, level. “It has been ten years,” he
wrote, “that the Church and the Christian street complain and protest, and
that we tell them that we understand their complaint and agree with them in
recognizing that what is needed is the correction of deviations and the
restoration of balance, but that it must be done in the shadow of the State and
in the framework of the institutions… Ten years have passed and here we are, recognizing
and saying in public that the State is not a State, that the institutions do not
exist, and that justice is not justice, but some dictated order… What happened
recently, I mean this mobilization of Muslims and so-called “secular
nationalists” against Patriarch Sfeir and the call of the Bishops, does not
augur well and constitutes a blow to dialogue, to civil peace and to national
reconciliation; first because what the Bkerké Declaration said is what
everyone, without exception, says, except if the group of profiteers and thieves
is taken into account; and second because the declaration is expressed in
moderate language and calls for solidarity and balance both inside the country
and at the level of our relations with Syria.”[8]
Pragmatic discourse
and langue-de-bois
The third type of disrespectable speech is characterized by
what is known as langue-de-bois. One
should perhaps be grateful to the Prime Minister, Mr Rafic Hariri, for honoring
his promise to defend freedom of expression under all its aspects and to have
blocked, at least temporarily, this slow death sentence to democracy which was
described, on 14 June 2000, by the director of the Middle East Forum, Daniel
Pipes, before the Subcommittee of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
“The implications of occupation for Lebanon have been dire. What had been the
most open of the Arabic-speaking countries, boasting decentralized power, real
democracy, rule of law, unimpeded movement and a Hong Kong-style free market,
along with independent schools and an unfettered press, has turned into
something like a minor version of the totalitarian state of Syria.”[9]
The Prime Minister intends to put an end to this creeping dictatorship which is
run by both the Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services, and, by doing so, to
rehabilitate the image of Lebanon in the eyes of potential Western investors who
are sensitive to the respect of human rights. One hopes he will also be able to
undo the schemes of the intelligence services which may appear discreet, but are
no less devious for that. In any case, even if freedom of expression is finally recognized
by the government as a fundamental right, the citizens’ free speech faces, at
all levels of the power structure, an ultimate rejection. One is warned that one
has no chance to start a debate on the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The message
is clear: you can say whatever you wish but you should know that you will change
nothing; the Syrian presence is “legal, necessary and temporary.” This is a
sacred leitmotiv of official discourse, it cannot be violated or changed: it is
the discourse of langue-de-bois.
This third type of discourse wants to be pragmatic.
The argument is the following: let us leave aside the thorny political problem
of Syro-Lebanese relations. The Syrian army and its intelligence services will
eventually leave Lebanon under the pressure of the Great Powers, it was not us
who got them in, and it will not be us who will make them leave. Meanwhile, let
us tackle the unprecedented economic crisis which the population is mired in.
This is the more serious challenge. Such a discourse occludes two realities
which undermine its content. First, that no power will come to our rescue if the
people and the government which is supposed to represent them do not express,
with all the means that they have at their command, their rejection of Syrian
control over the country. These powers are tired from hearing the accusation of
interference in the internal affairs of the country, every time they recall UN
Resolution 520, which stipulates the withdrawal of all foreign powers from
Lebanon, and every time they repeat their support for the independence and
sovereignty of this country. The Lebanese government could no doubt improve the
people's lives, but it cannot make Lebanon again the regional economic pole
which it once was. Economic prosperity is narrowly linked to political decision.
Therefore the political domination of Lebanon is not of a nature that encourages
investors, whether they are Lebanese or foreign.
For the defenders of the pragmatic discourse, the
leitmotiv: ─“the Syrian presence is legal, necessary and
temporary”─ seeks to
relieve Syria on the political front in order to obtain a free hand in the
economy. It is not the same however for those who, at various levels of the
political and social pyramid, owe their place, influence and privileges to
Syria, and who would be reduced to nothing without its presence. The perennial
character of Syrian control over Lebanon is for them absolutely vital, and they
get into a panic when are disarmed the three terms of their slogan on Syrian
presence as “legal, necessary and temporary.” They also get into a panic
when they are reminded the affirmation of Syrian vice-president Khaddam: “Our
forces have entered Lebanon without soliciting anybody's authorization, and will
leave in the same way”, and the official request, which was left without
response, and which was expressed by two Lebanese presidents who, in 1982 and
1983, demanded from Syria that it withdraw its forces.[10]
They get into a panic when they are asked what strategic necessity is served by
the presence of the Syrian army and the Syrian intelligence on the outskirts of
the presidential palace, of the Ministry of Defence, and on the whole of
Lebanese territory. And they get into a panic when they are reminded that the
decision taken in Taef was to redeploy Syrian troops to the Bekaa as a prelude
to their total and definitive withdrawal from Lebanon, and that this has been
constantly postponed for the past eight years, without any valid reason to
justify this delay. Their obstinacy is however not worrying, for as soon as
Lebanon recovers its sovereignty, they will switch sides or leave the country.
Disdain for society
It is evident that the orchestrated practice of these three
types of discourse in which are mixed, in variable proportions, logomachy,
double speak and langue-de-bois tends
to pervert the language itself and the social relations mediated by language.
Confronted by a rational usage of language, concerned with understanding reality
and speaking the truth, the irrational use that is made of language by
disrespectable speech seeks to adapt reality to words and betray their meaning.
To some extent, it does not care about reality, or even about meaning. Words get
associated in a mechanical way with each another because, as a linguist says,
“one can talk by thinking words, without thought being real; this is the law
of all reflexes; the automatic act gets substituted for the conscious act,”
and language becomes “a pillow of intellectual laziness.”[11]
In these conditions, discussion over disagreements and differences, which is so
essential to the democratic ideal, finds itself annulled, as is annulled the
critical discernment which establishes the faculty of judgment. Social coherence
is broken, and solidarity gives way to distrust. The national dialogue which is
called for by rational discourse cannot be established. This is perhaps the
hidden objective: to prevent dialogue, because it would necessarily disrupt the
advantages brought about by the status quo.
“There is a large difference”, writes Saoud al-Maoula
on this point, “between those who want, for Syria and the Arabs, honour,
dignity, freedom and democracy, and those who, for partisan or selfish reasons,
want Syria to be an instrument of domination and oppression, of repression of
freedoms, of the violations of people’s dignity. There is a large difference
between those who take upon themselves the preoccupations of the nation and the
claims of people in terms of reform and change, those who care for the unity of
people, for their interests and dignity, in Lebanon and in Syria,… and those
on the other hand who brandish the slogan “unity of course, unity of
destiny” so as to give way to the politics of division and destruction, to the
point of accusing others of treason and apostasy. The difference is large
between those who try to give actuality to the formula “One people in two
States” and those who force onto people the reality of “One state with two
peoples”, and who are the reason for the drying up of the relations between
two brotherly peoples and for the development of Lebanese racism towards all our
Arab brothers… Responsibility for this waste is not because of the signatures
onto the Bkerké Declaration, or the statements of Walid Jumblatt, or Omar Karamé,
or Nasib Lahoud, or Boutros Harb, or the silence of Hussein Husseini, and even
less so the wisdom and moderation of Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine. Those who are
responsible are the tenants of stupid policies, of unwholesome authoritarianism,
of repression and terror, and disdain for all the lasting values and all the
principles upon which Lebanon is founded.”[12]
Disdain for civil society turns into perversion when, in
order to argue that without the presence of Syrian forces Lebanon would be again
the theatre of communal fight, the Authorities do not hesitate to provoke
periodically, in a number of circles, controlled trouble or high-pitched
speeches which are supposed to trigger among the population the fear of a return
to internal war. In reality, few people are fooled by a tactic which is part of
the classical arsenal of divide and rule. What is new since last summer, that is
since the liberation of political language and the de facto consensus which is growing among the Lebanese on
fundamental questions, is that the intelligence services show evident signs of
nervousness: they do not even care to salvage the appearance and use the
grossest stratagems. “Who has taken”, Samir Frangié asks, “the initiative
in Akkar to push the ulamas to insult Patriarch Sfeir and to call for the
presidents of all the municipalities of the region to publish a statement
calling for the Syrian forces in Lebanon to remain ? Can one think for a second
that these are ‘spontaneous’ initiatives ? And the demonstration in Tripoli
during which slogans which insulted the Maronite Patriarch were expressed in the
presence of ministers and deputies, is it also ‘spontaneous’ ?… One must
face the fact that the Authorities are today at war with society. Since the
issue of Syrian presence in Lebanon was raised, they multiply threats and
intimidation attempts, refusing any dialogue with the citizens.”[13]
Hatred for the
nation
Disrespectable speech does not limit itself to establishing
hurdles to national dialogue, it concerns the historical foundations of the
nation by expressing its frenzy against the almost total concordance between the
declarations of the Druze leader and those of the Maronite Patriarch, who
represent each of the founding communities of Lebanon. To understand the
magnitude of this hostility, it is worth pausing for a moment at what I would
call “the Jumblatt phenomenon”. In the first phase, his detractors asked why
he turned against Syria, to whom he was closely allied. Jumblatt explained it
clearly on September 12: “Some Lebanese intelligence services which, like many
Lebanese, claim an alliance with Syria, have been a burden to the population,
and they have tried to sow discord and to undermine public liberties. This
cannot continue. It is not normal that they intervene everywhere, in
universities, in trade unions, in public life, in the press, in the name of
common security.”[14]
On October 24, he protested further: “It is astonishing that after 25 years,
Syria has not yet understood that it must stop interfering in the internal
Lebanese political game, and that it must cease to cast a systematic veto
against any person who would be minimally representative of the Christian
community.”[15] The fullness of his
thought is summarized in one of those hitting sentences the secret of which he
knows well: “Before China took over Hong Kong, it threw a slogan: one country,
two policies. In our case it is: two countries with one policy. We need two
countries and two policies. With minimal coordination.”[16]
Jumblatt’s opponents ask why and how he offers an arm to
the Christians, with whom there is a troubled past: “Does he want us to
believe this big lie about his national role; is this national role illustrated
by his massacre of Christians in the Mountain, for which he wants now to be
absolved by offering higher bids, to the detriment of Syria ?”[17]
It is in these terms that this deputy from the Syrian Baath spoke in the midst
of Parliament, ending it with death threats. More dignified, but no less hostile
was a journalist who considered it “necessary to distinguish between Walid
Jumblatt and those who support his positions towards Syria,”[18],
but who have reason to be his historical or ideological foes and will not fail
to turn their back on him. One finds, in other articles, similar declarations
whose authors are apparently disconcerted by the reconciliation of the Druze
leader with yesterday’s enemies. A truly uncouth argument, because no one has
ever heard of the need for reconciliation among friends ! Those students of the
High School of Engineers who wrote next to the announcement of Walid
Jumblatt’s lecture at Saint Joseph’s University ─ “An enemy we
respect and love” ─, understood this well. Should one forget that it is
often external or domestic wars that forge nations? Should one forget,
appropriately, that conflicts and reconciliation which mark the history of the
Mountain, have contributed to sculpting a real national conscience, which has
thereafter extended to the people of the littoral and the periphery ?
The bad faith of those who want to see in the recent Druze-Christian
rapprochement some nostalgia of the times of the Mutasarrifiyya is further
illustration of the logomachic discourse. However distasteful to his enemies,
Walid Jumblatt has acquired the stature of a national leader. He locates in the
founding history of his community the legitimacy of the role as unifier which he
seeks. This was underlined well by Ghassan Tueini as soon as the legislative
elections were over: “ Only Walid Jumblatt knows how to position himself in
the logic of Lebanese legacy and give his electoral campaign its historical
dimension. He has presented his victory to all men who are fond of liberty and
democracy, or rather the victory of the mountain in the two Choufs.”[19] Jumblatt himself is
conscious of his legitimacy as a national leader: “We are, ultimately, the
heirs of a great Emir of this Mountain, the Emir of coexistence and
independence, Emir Fakhreddin.”[20]
And the Maronite Patriarch recognized in him “a great national leader
representing a community which constitutes one of the pillars of the Lebanese
entity.”[21] When a pluri-confessional
nation like ours is threatened in its very existence, it is natural that
salvation should come from a reaction of the founding communities. This is the
conclusion which Issa Ghorayeb drew in a text with a significant title:
─“Massive Minority”─, by underlining the fall of all the taboos
and the liberation of Lebanese political language: “In this evolution of the
minds, the country owes it mostly to two men:
Patriarch Sfeir, whose admirable combativeness will have vanquished the
onslaught of some as well as the cold reservations of others. And Walid Jumblatt,
who with unparalleled courage, has offered the shining proof that Lebanon which
has at last become Lebanese is not the mad dream of the Christians alone.”[22]
Humiliation of the
State
To the humiliated society and the loathed nation is
superposed a humiliated State, whose haughty speech is nothing else, to the
population, than a sad process of verbal compensation, as it stands in perfect
contradiction with reality. To say, for instance, that the relations between
Lebanon and Syria are “brotherly and permanent”, is to ignore that for the
past twenty-five years, they are, in the strict sense of the term, relations of
domination of which Lebanon ─ society, nation and State ─, has not
finished paying the price. To say that any questioning of these relations is
dangerous, because it could break national unity, is to expect national unity
where there is none, since part of the population has been marginalized by Syria
for the past ten years, while the remainder of the people has been forced to
collaborate, and while any movement aiming at national understanding is being
systematically blocked. To say that the problem of Syro-Lebanese relations must
be treated only from State to State, is to presuppose that the two States are
equal partners, while one is under severe tutelage, unable to represent public
opinion and the aspirations of its people. As for the term ‘democracy’,
which is repeated under various modulations, it has been emptied of all
significance. “In the past,” Alia Riad al-Solh writes, “we used to export
free thought to all oppressed people in the Arab world. Today we import a single
thought, so that it oppresses us.”[23]
Single thought is the daughter of the principle, “unity
of the road, unity of destiny,” which the dominant state has succeeded in
imposing upon its vassal, but which remains for the majority of the population
an empty slogan, destined to globally justify the execution by Lebanon, to its
detriment, of Syrian diktats. When the slogan tries to be elaborated, the
discourse which results becomes the more peremptory because of its incoherence.
As Alia al-Solh explained, “logic is in Lebanon no longer the normative logic
we know. It has exploded into a multitude of logics which get done and undone
depending on the circumstances of oppression.”[24]
Thus, for instance, a stunned population wonders what could be meant by “a
state at war cannot deploy its army on its borders.” It wonders what national
interest there is for Lebanon to defy the United Nations and the European Union,
which recommend with insistence, but to no avail, that the army be sent to the
South. It wonders finally why the control of Syria over Lebanon must remain
until the liberation of the Golan. Alia al-Solh recalls in this respect how, at
the end of the French mandate, when Lebanon gained its independence before
Syria, Lebanon was not asked to renounce its independence until independence was
gained to Syria: “Then relations between the two countries were in conformity
with the rule, and marked by mutual respect and the rules of courtesy.”[25]
More royalist than the king, the Lebanese Authorities want
us to understand that if the Syrian army withdraws, its intelligence services
will remain and that the Syrian presence will continue at least until the
conclusion of a comprehensive and total peace. This means that the restoration
of independence to Lebanon is adjourned sine
die. This, in turn, puts at risk the Pact which presided in 1943 over the
establishment of an independent State. The minimal principle underlying the
Pact, one remembers, was the famous double negation “Neither East nor West”,
i.e. the renunciation by Christians of the protection of France against the
renunciation by the Muslims of union with Syria. But this principle is openly
flouted, and Lebanon has become virtually a Syrian province against the will of
all its citizens.
Modern Lebanon has known 32 years of independence between
two mandates, and the two mandates are very different from each another. A
political veteran likes to underline this difference: “France had at least the
decency to choose the better group amongst those available for the management of
public affairs. The most competent and most honest people were called to task,
both at the political and administrative levels, and the Administration was
effective. Today the most bizarre appointments are made. Distribution of posts
is made according to quotas and influence. One has often seen fraud in the
qualification of seekers of some positions. And when this is not sufficient,
intimidation is resorted to.” Then he underlines the decline of democracy
after Taef: “Before Taef, domestic political life was active and passably
acceptable at the level of democratic freedoms… Today, following the notorious
marching orders,… it is deliquescing. The only freedom left to the local
political actors is to destroy each other in order to get more advantages.”[26]
All happens as if the Syrian mandate, imposed upon Lebanon in the wake of Taef,
has as its objective to teach the Lebanese how to unlearn democracy and to
forget even the taste of independence.
Ladies and
Gentlemen,
On 21 November 2000, on the eve of independence day, the
USJ students, joined by students from other universities and students from high
school, demonstrated in large numbers from the Medical Science Campus to the
National Museum, to demand the real independence of their country. Amongst the
banners brandished by the demonstrators, three carried inscriptions the meaning
and scope of which it seems to me useful to develop in conclusion.
The first banner said: “Yes, thank you, but it’s
enough.” After the word of courtesy – thanks for the services rendered –
the word of rejection: no to the continued presence of Syrian forces and their
intelligence agents on Lebanese territory; no to the machinations which pretend
that the nation is divided confessionally, and that it always needs a tutor; no
to the use of Lebanon and the Lebanese to the exclusive profit of Syria, under
the false pretext of a common strategy; no, strictly no, to reducing Lebanon to
the de facto status of a Syrian
province.
The second banner read: “Resistance will not die.”
Resistance continues today to maintain alive the language of protest and to
defend free expression. No to the perverse twinning of the freedom of expression
with the imperatives of security alleged by the Authorities. No to the
stratagems of the intelligence services to confine again the discourse of
protest to the ambit of a marginalized Christian community; no to the visit of
Security agents to the Administration of the University to ask for the names of
candidates to alumni elections or to enquire about demonstration plans; no to
the infiltration of their young hirelings amongst the students of various
universities.
The third banner said: “We want dialogue.”
Demonstrators took over the idea, which was expressed by political and religious
personalities from all sides, to call for a national congress that debates Syro-Lebanese
relations and envisages the future of a liberated Lebanon. It is important
therefore that the de facto consensus,
which has been underlined by the Lebanese despite the Authorities, gets
consolidated and formalized by an official national understanding, not between
the deputies, but by way of a procedure which needs to be specified in utmost
detail, between qualified representatives of the country’s political, economic
and educational spheres. This is also why it is difficult to understand, if not
as a joke, the affirmation that Parliament is the same as the National Congress
being sought, especially when one knows how the majority of deputies have been
elected.
But our young men and women can be reassured: the process
of liberation is irreversible. In the absence of a National Congress which is
presently impossible to convene, intercommunal networks of intellectuals and
professionals meet periodically to promote the discourse of resistance and think
about the future of a liberated Lebanon. The moment will come when Syria will
understand, perhaps before the Lebanese political representatives themselves,
that it is in its interest to completely withdraw from Lebanon, to respect the
country’s independence and sovereignty, and to establish relations of mutual
recognition. But the mistrust of Lebanese towards Syria will not really
dissipate until the bilateral relations will get translated into an exchange of
diplomatic relations, as is the case amongst all Arab states.
As for the political future of Lebanon, it is also
reassuring, despite the belief of many young Christians who have only known war
and its aftermath, and who wonder about the degree of allegiance of Muslims to
the common land. What they should know is that, with a delay which is
understandable, Muslims share today the same national feeling as Christians, the
same intellectual and emotional attachment to the Lebanese nation.
Most remarkable, in this context, are the words of Imam
Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddin on the specificity of Lebanon, which he shared with
the Arab press correspondents in Paris a month before his death: “I was”, he
said, “one of the first people to propose the abolition of political
confessionalism… I had established my own project around the idea of numerical
democracy, predicting the suppression of the political existence of communities,
the adoption of the individual as the sole political entity, and the rejection
of communitarian quotas which decide the formation of Parliament and government.
These last years however, I have thought a lot, so much so that I am not of the
same opinion any longer: I consider the confessional regime as a fundamental
formula for Lebanon, on condition that it is cleansed… I have renounced
numerical democracy in favour of a political communalism, but, as I just said,
the application of this formula is presently subject to corruption and must
reformed. I would like to see that the Lebanese are ensured a larger
representation, and would want such guarantees as to be certain that no
community can complain from being crushed by the majority.”
The faith of Shamseddin in the specificity of Lebanon goes
further: “As for the relations between Syria and Lebanon, I have said and
repeated that Lebanon is to remain forever out of any unionist project. Even if
one supposes that a unified Arab Republic is established from Tangiers to Aden,
Lebanon will be the second Arab Republic, it will remain the other Arab
Republic. No union. The nature of Lebanese society requires it and the interest
of Arabs also requires it. It is preferable for Lebanon, and for our Arab and
Islamic environment, that the country remains an independent, sovereign
Republic, which does not get united with any other country, which collaborates
with them all, but does not let itself dissolve its existence in any type of
union.”[27]
Ladies and
Gentlemen,
In all our communities today, voices rise to request the liberation of Lebanon, the recovery of its independence, the full exercise of its sovereignty. These voices are destined to enlarge their audience, to shake off the pusillanimity of some and to confound the interested expectations of others. The national debate is open, it is irreversible. But it does not only concern the means to reinforce the resistance against foreign control over Lebanon, it also involves an intense critical reflection on the future of the country. In this respect, Saint Joseph’s University is a privileged place to welcome and stimulate rigorous and honest discussions over our agreements and disagreements, with a view to forming a national consensus. With the means it has at its disposal, Saint Joseph’s University must be at the heart of the democratic debate.
[1]
Amy Gutmann, director of the University Centre for Human Values at Princeton
University, Introduction to
Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism:
Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton 1994, 23.
[2]
L'Orient-Le Jour, 15 September 2000.
[3]
L'Orient-Le Jour, 20 August 2000, 2.
[4]
An-Nahar, 2 October 2000.
[5]
Thomas L. Friedman, “Lebanon: Soul on Ice”, New
York Times, July 18, 2000.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Mu’min Dennawi, An-Nahar, 22
September 2000, 12.
[8]
Al-Mustaqbal, 24 September 2000.
[9]
Testimony of Daniel Pipes, in USCFL (United States Committee for a Free
Lebanon), 14 June 2000.
[10]
“At the Arab Sommet in Fes in 1982, President Sarkis officially requested
Syria to withdraw its troups as had done already the other countries which
were taking part in what was called the Arab Force of Dissuasion… The
following year, in September, President Gemayel sent the General Secretariat
of the League a note repeating the Lebanese call for an Israeli withdrawal
and the departure of all foreign troups, in a document which was addressed
to President Hafez al-Assad.” (Emile Khoury,
L'Orient-Le Jour, 28 September 2000.)
[11]
Albert Sechehaye, “La pensée et la langue”, in Essais
sur le langage, Paris, “Le sens commun”, Minuit 1969, 88.
[12]
Saoud al-Maoula, “Who are the real friends of Syria ?”, An-Nahar,
11 November 2000.
[13]
Samir Frangié, “The barricades of the state”, L'Orient-Le
Jour, 20 December 2000.
[14]
L'Orient-Le Jour, 13 September 2000.
[15]
L'Orient-Le Jour, 25 October 2000.
[16]
L'Orient-Le Jour, 13 September 2000.
[17]
Speech of Asem Kanso, L'Orient-Le
Jour, 7 November 2000, 4.
[18]
Ibrahim al-Amin, As-Safir, 13
November 2000, 2.
[19]
An-Nahar, 21 August 2000.
[20]
L'Orient-Le Jour, 25 September 2000.
[21]
L'Orient-Le Jour, 9 November 2000, 3.
[22] L'Orient-Le Jour,
25 November 2000.
[23]
An-Nahar, 21 November 2000.
[24]
Id.
[25]
Id.
[26]
Reported by Emile Khoury, “Un système politique qui perd peu à peu de sa
spécificité,” L'Orient-Le
Jour, 26 October 2000.
[27]
An-Nahar, 7 December 2000, 5.
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