USCFL-Syria's Deterrence Policy

Following the killing of an Israeli soldier in a Hizbullah attack, Israel bombed a Syrian radar station in Lebanon (April 16, 2001). Syria refrained from immediate military retaliation, but tried, in a series of statements and leaks to the Arab press, to establish a policy of deterrence against Israel.

Part I. The Brinkmanship Policy

The first Syrian response to Israel's retaliation on Hizbullah's attack came during Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq Al-Shar's visit to Moscow. An official Syrian source, apparently Al-Shar' himself, declared that "Syria reserves the right to defend itself against any aggression."(1)

Later on in a telephone conversation between President Bush and President Assad, that was leaked to the Arabic press, Assad was vague: "The calls for restraint are no longer effective," said Assad to Bush, "we reserve the right to
react in the way we see fit." (2)

In the next stage Damascus stated that in its estimation, Sharon is interested in an escalation, but "Syria will not give him that present."(3) President Assad repeated this statement several days later in an interview with the Spanish daily El Pais: "A military retaliation to the attack on the Syrian radar," Assad said, "would mean fulfilling Ariel Sharon's wish to push the region into war when he wishes... Syria has never supported war, and there are different ways to respond to the Israeli attack." (4)

The "Rules of the Game"

Syria's reaction was shaped in the weeks that followed. In a series of leaks to the press, Syria tried to establish a
declared deterrence policy by forcasting its future reactions to another Israeli attack on Syrian targets in Lebanon.

The future Syrian reactions were leaked to the Arab press as prospective Syrian responses to three different scenarios. The leaks were given to journalist Ibrahim Hamidi, who is known to have close ties to Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq Al-Shar', and were published in an article in the London weekly Al-Wasat.(5)

According to Hamidi, "the Syrian leadership understands that Israel is militarily stronger than Syria." Therefore, the Syrians are interested in maintaining a "policy of brinkmanship" as much as they can, "without being dragged into an unnecessary confrontation, and without giving up Syria's right to respond to the Israeli bombing."

According to Hamidi, Damascus believe's that the Israeli bombing of the radar station was not a retaliation to Hizbullah's attack, as Israel claims, since Hizbullah had already made several attacks following the Israeli withdrawal, and Israel has only retaliated against Lebanese targets. Therefore, the Syrians believe Israel is trying "to change the [old] rules of the game" - an expression that was repeated countless times in Hamidi's articles, as well as in subsequent Syrian statements.

According to these "rules", Israel retaliated in the past only against Lebanese targets [particularly "Hizbullah targets" in South Lebanon]. A few times, when the casualties were high, Israel retaliated by destroying the Lebanese infrastructure. Since the withdrawal from South Lebanon, and despite threats, Israel refrained from escalating its retaliation, fearing, apparently, the fate of the Israeli hostages held by Hizbullah, and trying to avoid the creation of a new front.

According to the Syrians, the attack on the Syrian radar was a turning point and an Israeli signal that Jerusalem wants to cancel these "old rules of the game" and to create a new equation, in which the Israeli response to all Hizbullah attacks will be retaliation against Syrian targets in Lebanon.

Possible Scenarios

In order to deter Israel from such a change, the Syrian leadership leaked its future responses to three possible scenarios, based on Israel's prospective reactions to Hizbullah's next attack:

Scenario A

Israel reacts to Hizbullah's next attack by bombing Lebanese targets. This is, of course, the Syrian's preferred option. This will mean that "the American pressure [on Israel] was effective, the game has returned to its old rules, and peace will remain an option. Sharon has gotten the message."

Scenario B

Israel reacts to Hizbullah's next attack by bombing Syrian targets in Lebanon [as it did on April 16]. This is the new
equation that Syria believes, Israel is seeking to establish. This means that the "traditional rules" are no longer valid and that Syrian military positions will be bombed every time there is a Hizbullah attack on Israel. In this case, Syria warns, "it is likely that Hizbullah will attack in the heart of Israel, as President Lahoud promised."

Scenario C

In reaction to Hizbullah's next attack, Israel attacks Syrian targets in Syria. In this case, "the Syrians will have the right to launch missiles on Tel Aviv." The Syrians leaked to Hamidi that on the eve of the last Arab summit in Amman, the Syrian military tested a missile whose range is 700 km. Hamidi says Syria does not fear Israel's nuclear weapons "because these are [only] for deterrence, and not for use on the battlefield."

It should be noted that the Syrians have not committed themselves to a military reaction, even in the case of an attack on targets in Syria. They only stated their "right to attack Tel Aviv."

"The Rules of the Game" Are Put to the Test

Syria needed another Hizbullah attack in order to accurately determine whether Israel had changed the rules of the game or left the old rules intact. This attack came on May 14, when the Hizbullah launched anti-tank missiles at an IDF border position. Israel had no casualties and chose not to retaliate. Two days later, when the Syrian president visited Egypt, Israeli Defense Minister, Binyamin Ben Eliezer announced that he "sees Syria as responsible for everything that goes on in Lebanon."(6) The Syrian president cut short his two-day visit and hurried back to Damascus. The Syrians did not explain why the visit was cut off and claimed that President Assad and President Mubarak had agreed on all issues and that the visit had been completed. However, it seems that it was the Israeli
Minister of Defense's threats that brought Assad back to Damascus.

Following Israel's restraint proceeding Hizbullah's missile attack of May 14, Syria hurriedly declared the revival of the "old rules of the game". Ibrahim Hamidi once again published the Syrian position, as it was leaked to him by Damascus. He wrote that Hizbullah's missile attack was a "Syrian test" of "how well Sharon understood Damascus'
messages".(7)

Hamidi claimed that "it was not a coincidence that there were no Israeli casualties."(8) It is known that the main factor determining Israel's response to attacks against it, is the number of casualties it suffers. It seems, therefore, that the Syrians remained unsure about Israel's policy and need to clarify the Israeli policy by a series of "tests" that will gradually escalate. President Bashar Assad's sudden return to Damascus from his visit in Egypt is an additional testimony to the Syrian uncertainty about the Israeli policy. Therefore, Syrian Foreign Minister, Faruq Al-Shar' once again presented the Syrian position regarding the "rules of the game" when he visited Lebanon: "If Israel tries to change the [old] rules of the game, as it has been claimed in a number of newspapers, then we are preparing the rules with which we want to play this game," he said, adding: "Israel cannot unilaterally determine the rules of the game."(9)

The US in Syria's Political Considerations

"Syria relies on American pressure on Sharon to keep him from changing the 'traditional rules of the game' in Lebanon", Hamidi explained.(10) The Syrian leadership bases this belief on the model of American pressure on Sharon to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, a few hours after the Israeli army entered it. Washington "prevented Sharon from crossing the red lines," and the Syrian leadership expects the Americans to do the same with Israel's retaliation policy.

The Syrian leadership sees Washington today as the "equalizing force for Israel's military superiority." This is because Washington fears American interests in the Middle East, might be damaged. Therefore, Syria's bargaining chips against Washington include the threat of harming American political interests in the region. A Syrian-Israeli confrontation, Damascus explains, will lead to a collapse of the peace agreements between Israel and its neighboring countries Jordan and Egypt; endangering the American interests in the Gulf and in the Middle East; and a defeat of the American efforts to place new sanctions on Iraq.

Part II. Regional And International Factors

Between Washington and Baghdad: Iraq

Washington is ambivalent about Bashar Assad's regime. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, who recently visited Washington and met with President Bush, said in a press interview that "members of the [Lebanese] delegation sensed the Bush administration's desire to cooperate with the Syrian President, Dr. Bashar Assad. [The American message] went beyond expressing good intentions; it also addressed [Bashar Assad's] fine qualities. In this way [President Bush] wished to deliver a message to Damascus through Beirut." (11)

However, it is hard to imagine a true thaw in relations between the US and Syria, given the strengthening of Syrian-Iraqi cooperation, especially concerning oil, but also on the diplomatic and political level. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Damascus a number of months ago, with the aim of convincing the Syrian leadership to refrain from violating international sanctions on Iraqi oil, but to no avail. Syrian Oil Minister, Maher Jamal, said in Paris that, "Syria is preparing a project to lay a new [oil] pipeline from the Iraqi border to the mouth of the Banyas." When asked about Bashar Assad's promise to President Bush to transfer all of the oil from Iraq via the existing pipe, in accordance with the UN resolution, the minister responded that the old pipe has leaks. (12)

Journalist Ibrahim Hamidi, explained that there was a "misunderstanding" between Washington and Damascus, because Secretary of State Powell mistakenly understood from President Assad, that Syria intends to include the existing oil pipe in the framework of the UN resolutions, while the Syrian president referred to the new pipeline it plans to lay down. (13)

Furthermore, in recent weeks Damascus has invested extra energy to enhance its cooperation with Baghdad. The Syrian oil minister visited Baghdad, "in order to broaden the industrial and economic cooperation with Iraq." It was reported that the Syrian President will soon make the same trip, the first made by a Syrian president in twenty years. (14)

At the same time, Damascus sent a diplomat, Muhammad Tawwab, to open a Syrian bureau in the Algerian Embassy in Baghdad. An Iraqi bureau was opened in Damascus a year ago. (15)

The Syrians are trying to play to both Washington and Baghdad. On the one hand, they do not want to officially oppose the US proposed new sanctions regime because they need the US to pressure Israel and don't want to jeopardize the "international legitimacy," which is so important to them. Therefore, Syria officially expressed only "great caution" regarding the new planned sanctions on Iraq. According to the same tactics, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Faruq Al-Shar', refused to discuss the Iraqi issue with the American ambassador, Edward Walker, a month ago, claiming that Syria believes that first there must be "firm positions regarding the Israeli aggression against the Arabs." (16)

At the same time, Syria is working to improve relations with Iraq and to be the first to reap the expected fruits of the new sanctions regime. Hamidi reports that Syria wishes to receive the "lion's share" (17) in the economic agreements that Iraq will sign after the civil sanctions are lifted. (18) Damascus wants to broaden its exports to Iraq to a range of one billion dollars. Therefore, Syria is anxious to settle the new oil pipe project, the opening of borders between the two states, and other economic agreements. Syria is well aware of the outline of the new sanctions plan, since American Ambassador in Damascus, Ryan Crocker, gave a copy of the proposed sanctions to Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Walid Mu'allem. After the Syrians read the document, they decided to accelerate the economic
agreements with Iraq. (19)

It seems, in this case, that the Syrian choice between the US and Iraq has already been made. Bashar Assad's recent slew of anti-Semitic statements will not make improving relations with Washington any easier.

Between Washington and Damascus: The Blue Line

The Syrians and their Lebanese proxies were disappointed by the American administration's position concerning the border between Israel and Lebanon ("The Blue Line"). American Ambassador in Beirut, David Satterfield, has recently announced that, "there should be no dispute over the Shab'a Farms, since the Lebanese government officially agreed a year ago to the "Blue Line", and there is no reason to raise this issue again." (20)

Syria's Lebanese partners, on the other hand, claim that this was a misunderstanding, because Lebanon was to consent to this agreement only following a consultation with Syria. This consultation was not completed until June 16, 2000, the day the UN General Secretary declared that Israel had fulfilled UN Resolution 425.

Therefore, if the Syrians - who see the American administration as their main bargaining chip in their deterrence policy - hoped for an official change in the American position following the Israeli bombing of the radar station - they were in for a disappointment. The Americans continue to support the Israeli position on the issue of Hizbullah's attacks, and call for restraint from "all sides".

On the other hand, the American administration has interests with Syria. Although Syria completely ignores the American interests, both on the Israeli issue and the Iraqi issue, Washington has an interest in maintaining ties with Damascus, in order to facilitate the management of the Middle East crisis and in order to prevent a regional escalation. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that the administration's understanding of Israel's one-time attack on a Syrian target in Lebanon, serves as a green light for Israel to change the "rules of the game".

The Lebanese Factor

Following Hizbullah's previous attack on Israeli forces, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri criticized its "bad timing" in his newspaper, Al-Mustaqbal. On the eve of his trip to Washington, Al-Hariri feared that Hizbullah's attack would make it difficult for him to gain Washington's and the international community's support for his reform plan to save Lebanon's collapsing economy.

While Syria has now been dealing with the growing Lebanese opposition to its military presence in Lebanon, and with the international demand to deploy the Lebanese army in South Lebanon in order to prevent Hizbullah attacks, it responded by canceling Al-Hariri's planned meeting with Bashar Assad. Some Syrian proxies in Beirut even announced that Al-Hariri's criticism of Hizbullah was a green light for Israel to retaliate on the Syrian radar station.

Furthermore, the Syrian Foreign Minister implied that if there is a conflict of interest, Hizbullah's operations will take precedence over Al-Hariri's economic reforms. "A government that does not enjoy popular support, cannot succeed, even if it receives foreign aid," (21) Al-Shar' said while visiting Lebanon. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Omar Karami was invited to meet with President Bashar Assad, after the cancellation of Al-Hariri's visit, supposedly because of the Syrian President's "busy schedule", which prompted a wave of rumors in Beirut about "expected changes in the government."

This served as a signal to Al-Hariri that if he does not 'mend his ways', he will be replaced. Upon his return from the US, Al-Hariri had to explain that the editorial in his newspaper, criticizing Hizbullah's attack, was not properly understood. Al-Hariri said that the Bush administration did not raise the issue of Hizbullah's attacks at all, and this is a sign that the administration's economic aid to Lebanon does not depend on stopping Hizbullah's attacks.

Hizbullah's "test" attack gave Al-Hariri another opportunity to publicly 'mend his ways' and to announce that "the operation is part of Hizbullah's right to struggle for the liberation of its land from Israeli occupation." (22) These statements paved the way for the May 22, 2001 meeting between Assad and Al-Hariri in Damascus, where coordination was re-set to Syria's satisfaction.

Conclusion

By exposing possible scenarios of escalation in public statements and reliable leaks to the press, Syria is trying to establish a policy of deterrence against Israel, in order to prevent Israel from changing the "old rules of the game," according to which Israel retaliated against Lebanese - not Syrian - targets. This deterrence policy has yet to prove itself on the ground. Hizbullah's last missile attack was meant to be the first test of Syria's deterrence policy. Israel did not retaliate because there were no casualties.

Therefore, this first test was not sufficient. Bashar Assad's immediate return to Damascus after the Israeli Security Minister announced that Israel places the responsibility on Syria, indicates that Israel's policy is still an unknown for the Syrian leadership. "The Rules of the Game" will be assessed through Hizbullah's next attacks.

Another unknown is the position of the Bush administration, regarding possible escalation scenarios. The Syrians are relying on American pressure to restrain the Israeli responses. This does not keep Syria from eagerly promoting a thaw in relations with Iraq for the sake of being the first to reap the benefits of the new sanctions regime, in complete contradiction to the American interests. The Bush administration has felt out the new Syrian regime, both by Secretary of State Powell and his deputy, Walker, but these assessments have not indicated any possibility of tightening cooperation between Washington and Damascus. Syria rejected the American proposal to resume negotiations with Israel, and ignored the American position on the Iraqi issue and the American demand to restrain Hizbullah. The Bush administration's attitude toward the Syrian regime, both on the Israeli issue and the Iraqi issue, are the main factors that will shape US policies towards Syria.

(4) Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), May 3, 2001. It seems that one of these alternative responses is verbal escalation, because the day after this interview was published, the Syrian President launched an attack of anti-Semitic declarations, first at a press conference in Madrid with the Spanish Prime Minister: "Israel's racism is unprecedented in history, and is worse than that of the Nazis" (Al-Hayat, London-Beirut, May 4, 2001); and two days later at a press conference with the Pope, upon the latter's visit to Damascus: "They are trying to kill all of the principles of the monotheistic religions, with the same mentality as the betrayal of Jesus." (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, London, May 6, 2001).

17 A pun. The Arabic word for "lion" is "Assad". Therefore, "lion's share" also means "Assad's share".

Would you like to comment on this article?

If you would like to send us your thoughts on this article, please click the button below:

If you would like to read feedback submitted by other visitors, please click on the button below:

Article:	Syria's Deterrence Policy
Author:	Yotam Feldner
Date:	May 2001