USCFL - Terrorism as a Preferred Instrument of Syrian Policy

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Article:	Terrorism as a Preferred Instrument of Syrian Policy
Author:	Dr. Reuven Erlich
Date:	March 2002

(As appeared on the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism Website)

The following is an update of research on this topic published in 1998.

Terrorism is a modus operandi through which targeted violence is used against citizens, in order to achieve political objectives or even strategic goals. Terrorist organizations are the organizations that carry out acts of terror as a means to promote their goals.

Countries that sponsor terrorism are countries that use terrorism and terrorist organizations as an instrument to advance their objectives, host terror organizations and provide them shelter and support. The involvement of these countries is liable to manifest in various ways, beginning with different levels of indirect aid to terrorists or terrorist organizations, escalate to initiation and marshaling of terrorist attacks by terrorist organizations, and end with directly carrying out acts of terror through the state-run apparatuses of the country. Syria, under the rule of Hafez al-Assad the father and subsequently Bashar the son, belongs to a “club” of seven states defined by the American State Department as states that sponsor terrorism (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, North Korea and Cuba are also members of this “club.”)

The purpose of this paper is to update and complete the study of the use of the “terror weapon” by Assad’s regime as a preferred instrument for promoting Syria’s strategic goals. The study was written about three years ago by Dr. Reuven Ehrlich, an expert on Syrian and Lebanese affairs and currently the manager of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.), and a Research Fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (I.C.T.) at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. The original study was published in 1998, and copies of it may be found in Hebrew and English at the Information Center at the CSS or at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism’s Web site. The contents of the paper solely reflect the opinions and viewpoints of its author.

The need to update the study stems from the dramatic developments that have occurred since its publishing, in Syria, the Middle East and the international arena: President Hafez al-Assad died, his inexperienced son Bashar succeeded him, the Israeli Defense Forces withdrew from Lebanon, the Intifadah broke out in the “territories”, and in the international area, the US opened a campaign against international terrorism and against the countries that provide sponsorship and assistance to it – following Bin Laden’s attacks on September 11, 2001.

The main conclusions that arose from the former study about operating the “terror weapon” during Hafez al-Assad’s regime were as follows:

Assad (the father’s) regime systematically and continuously used the “terror weapon” throughout his thirty-year regime, ever since his rise to power in 1970. The basic reason for this was the wide gap between the far reaching aspirations of the Ba’ath regime to achieve regional hegemony and a leading role in the Israeli-Arab conflict and the objective limitations and weaknesses of Syria from a military, economic and demographic perspective, placing it in a position of regional and international inferiority.
From their perspective, intensive use of the “terror weapon” enabled the Syrian regime to promote a series of important objectives in the realms of domestic and external policies: guaranteeing the survival and stability of the regime at home; applying pressure on Syria’s enemies in the Arab world; promoting the “Syrian order” in Lebanon; “punishment” of Western nations and achievement of political gain from them and above all, applying pressure on Israel in order to further Syria’s goals in the Israeli-Arab conflict.
The targets and emphasis of the “terror weapon” and the manner in which it has been operated by Assad’s regime underwent periodic changes. In this respect, the changes in the 1990s in the manner in which the “terror weapon” was used were especially prominent. The basis for these changes were: the elimination of domestic opposition; the fall of the Soviet Union; Syria’s isolation in the Arab arena; Syria’s participation in the peace process and its growing need for the United States. All of these propelled the Syrian regime to attempt to shake off its image as a country that supports terrorism through tactical changes of everything related to the way terrorism is used, although without strategic concessions concerning its use of terrorism as a preferred means of promoting its goals.
In the framework of these changes, three prominent differences in the modus operandi of the “terror weapon” during the 1990s may be identified, in comparison with the first twenty years of Assad’s regime: the Syrians strictly used proxies, “terrorist subcontractors” and refrained from direct involvement in terrorism as a result of lessons learned in the 1980s, primarily the “Hindawi affair” (1986); the order of priority of those targeted by terrorism also changed: Israel became the central and preferred target, whereas pro-Western Arab nations and Western nations ceased to serve as primary targets for terrorism initiated by Syria; the prestige of left-wing Palestinian organizations declined while increasing importance was placed on Hizballah and Islamic Palestinian organizations operated jointly by Syria and Iran, two states that sponsor terrorism and are strategic allies.

The changes in the nature of the use of the “terror weapon” during the 1990s enabled Syria to become involved in the peace process subsequent to the Madrid Conference. This resulted in the anomalous phenomenon of a state conducting peace negotiations with Israel under the auspices of the United States, continuing to have diplomatic ties with the U.S. and other Western countries, active in different UN forums, using the UN decisions to promote its own interests, while at the same time continuing its sophisticated use of the “terror weapon,” which is the reason they still remain on the American State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism.

Analysis of the use of the “terror weapon” in Syrian policy during the first 15 months of Bashar al-Assad’s rule clearly indicates that Bashar the son is an obvious extension of Hafez the father. The current status (as of October 10, 2001) with regard to assistance that Syria provides to various terrorist organizations is as follows:

Out of the 28 “foreign terrorist organizations” appearing on the last biennial report released by the State Department (2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations, released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, October 5, 2001), defined as organizations that pose a threat to the national security of the United States, the Syrians provide different levels of sponsorship and support to at least seven organizations (that is at least 25% of the organizations appearing on the list). In addition, the Syrians provide sponsorship and support to other terrorist organizations which, for various reasons, do not appear on the State Department list.

The seven terrorist organizations appearing on the State Department list from October 5^th, which receive Syrian sponsorship and support are:

Hamas (“Islamic Resistance Movement”)
Hizballah (“Party of God”)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP – GC, Jibril faction)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, George Habash faction)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

The terrorist organizations to which Syria has continued to provide sponsorship and support during the Bashar al-Assad period may be divided into four categories, according to their natures:

Hizballah: a Lebanese terrorist organization that receives military and financial support, political and operational guidance and ideological inspiration from Iran, which is defined by the State Department as a country that sponsors terrorism. Hizballah receives assistance from the Iranian “Revolutionary Guards” / “Al-Quds” forces located in the Syrian controlled Beqa’ .
Palestinian Islamic terrorist organizations: Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Palestinian left-wing terrorist organizations: PFLP – GC (Jibril); PFLP (Habash); PFLP (Hawatmeh); the Palestine Liberation Front; “Fatah” / Abu Mussa and the extreme faction of the “Popular Struggle Front” (some of these organizations do not appear on the State Department list).
Middle Eastern terrorist organizations and other international terrorist organizations that find sanctuary or receive assistance in Syria and in Lebanon.

Headquarters, training camps, installations, and logistic, political and propaganda offices of most of these terrorist organizations are located in Syria: Syria is the primary center for the terrorist left wing organizations including headquarters and training camps; Syria serves as an important arena of activity for Hamas outside the “territories” and senior Hamas officials carry out their operations there in the operational, political and propaganda fields; the infrastructure and the headquarters of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad outside the “territories” are located in the vicinity of Damascus, from where operational activities in the “territories” are directed. The activities of these organizations include the transfer of instructions for acts of terrorism in Israel and the “territories”, the smuggling of weapons to the “territories” (via Jordan and via the sea), training and drills, propaganda and incitement directed at fanning terrorist acts (through Jibril’s “Radio al-Quds” among others).

The leaders of most of these terrorist organizations reside in Syria, where they direct the operational, political and propaganda activities of their organizations. The senior officials of the seven terrorist organizations that appear on the State Department’s list and receive Syrian sponsorship and support are as follows:

Dr. Ramadan Shalah, Secretary General of the “Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” and his deputy Ziad Nakhlah;
Khaled Mash’al, the head of the Hamas political bureau, Musa Abu-Marzuk, his deputy and Imad al-Alami, chairman of Hamas Interior Committee, representative of the organization in Syria and an important figure in activating the organization’s military apparatus for carrying out attacks;
Ahmed Jibril, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command and Jihad Jibril, his son.
Maher Taher, PELP spokesman, and other senior officials in the leadership of the organization.

In addition, there are other senior leaders and activists of other terrorist organizations, also residing in Damascus, who do not appear on the State Department, such as Nayef Hawatmeh, the leader of the “Democratic Front.” Furthermore, there are Hizballah leaders residing in Lebanon, a country under Syrian patronage. The most prominent Hizballah leaders are Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of the organization and Imad Fayez Mughniyya, his Operations deputy (who is on the FBI’s “most wanted list” published on October 10, 2001).

The Syrians allow Hizballah and the Palestinian organizations under their sponsorship to maintain military – operational, propaganda, and political infrastructures in regions under their control in Lebanon. The military operational infrastructure of the Hizballah stands out in particular. It was built in southern Lebanon, in Beirut suburbs, and in the Beqa’ Valley with the assistance and backing of the Iranian “Revolutionary Guards.” Furthermore, the Syrians do not encourage the Lebanese Army to enter Palestinian refugee camps or to impose its authority upon the Shiite villages in the Beqa’ Valley and put an end to the centers of terrorism that thrive in them. For example:

Operating out of the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp in the vicinity of Sidon (Saida), are a terrorist faction of the “Fatah” led by Akid (Colonel) Munir al-Maqdah and a terrorist organization that is connected with Bin Laden called “Usbat al-Ansar” (“the follower faction”) led by Ahmed Abd al-Karim (Abu Mohjin). Both of these organizations came out with statements of condemnation against the US and support for Bin Laden after the United States began its campaign against Bin Laden and his supporters. Jordanian media reported (Oct. 16) that Jordanian security forces thwarted an attempt by the “Usbat al-Ansar” organization to strike a number of prominent embassies (including those of Jordan, Britain and the US). Lebanese media reported (Oct. 17) that two organization members were arrested and charged with the planning of military operations against American interests.
The Syrian controlled Beqa’ Valley serves as a training ground for Hizballah and other Middle Eastern and international terrorist organizations. Centers for crime and terrorism that benefit from the local “autonomy” are common inside the Beqa’ Valley: the village of Britel, south of Baalbek, not far from the Syrian Lebanese border, stands out in this respect. It serves as a center for currency counterfeiting and for drug production (to be elaborated upon below).

Extremist Islamic terror groups that were active in Arab states against pro-Western regimes find sanctuary in Syria and Lebanon, where they conduct their training activities and maintain their logistical infrastructure, along with subversive and terrorist activities against Arab regimes. All of this occurred during the period of Assad the father, despite repeated protests from pro-Western Arab countries including Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, demanding that Syria cease to assist these terrorist groups. It is assumable that some of these Islamic terrorist groups are connected to Bin Laden and related organizations.

During the period of Assad the father, Syria granted extensive assistance to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the P.K.K.), which is on the State Department list of terrorist organizations. On the other hand, they were forced to keep a lower profile in their support for this organization and to force its leader, Abdallah Ocalan to leave Syria due to the severe crisis initiated by Turkey in 1998. One may assume that parts of this infrastructure continue to be positioned inside Syria during the period of Bashar.

The Syrians grant protection to criminal and terrorist industries in the Beqa’ Valley, whose profits serve, among other things, to finance the activities of Hizballah and other terrorist factions. In areas where the Syrian Army is positioned and in areas controlled by the Hizballah organization, sophisticated “industries” of the growth and production of drugs (hashish, cocaine and heroin) and of Western and Arab currency counterfeiting (primarily of American $100 bills) are widespread.
Terrorism and crime under Syrian sponsorship: $100 bill counterfeited at Britel print shop, owned by the Shii’te Mazlum clan linked to “Hizballah.”

The “products” of these “industries” are smuggled into Western countries, into Arab countries and Israel, and some of it serves to finance the terrorist infrastructure and activities of the Hizballah abroad. The Syrians allow these “industries” to exist and prosper in areas under their control. This is due to the fact that senior Syrian government officials, the Syrian Army and Syria’s intelligence apparatus all benefit from the immense profits that are reaped from it and since it is in their interest not to enter into clashes with the Hizballah and with criminal gangs involved in the drug and currency counterfeiting businesses.

Syria and Lebanon serve as centers for the organization of terrorist cells abroad. Terrorist organizations under Syrian protection, including the “Hizballah,” the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas have military – operational, political, social and propaganda infrastructures abroad. Taylor, the US Coordinator for Counterterrorism referred to this during a hearing in the House of Representatives on October 10^th when addressing terrorist organizations that operate in Latin America. He mentioned the presence of “Hizballah,” Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad inthe region where the borders of Argentina – Brazil – Paraguay meet. It is well known that the Islamic terrorist infrastructure in this notorious region, with the aid of Iran, was connected with the terrorist attacks directed against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires (1992) and the Jewish Community Cenin Buenos Aires (1994).
Permit (Feb. 1998) issued to a well-known drug dealer and signed by Syrian defence minister Mustafa Tlass.

The Palestinian Intifadah, which broke out two months after Bashar’s rise to power, created a “window of opportunity” for Syria, allowing it to activate the terrorist organizations under its tutelage and use them to “export” terrorist attacks to Israel and the “territories.” Illustrations attesting to the depth of Syria’s assistance to terrorist organizations that operate on its land may be found in two episodes that occurred in the last months exposing terrorist networks of Hamas and of the PFLP – GC organization in the “territories” (based on indictments served by the IDF Military Prosecution):

The exposure of more than 20 activists from the Hamas organization who were recruited from Arab countries, trained in Syria, where they received guidelines for operation, were sent to the “territories” and were involved in murderous terrorist attacks directed against Israeli citizens:
Two terrorists were exposed from Jibril’s PFLP - GC organization. These two had been recruited from the Nablus region, trained in Syria, sent back to the “territories”, and instructed to carry out mass suicide attacks on the “Azrieli Towers” in Tel Aviv:

In the summer of 2001, the two terrorists were sent from the Ein Beit al-Ma refugee camp near Nablus to Syria for military training. The two left for their mission on July 10^th, reaching the Jordanian-Syrian border via Amman. Their papers were checked at the Syrian border where a Syrian policeman handed them a brown envelope with the words to the Syrian intelligence offices in Damascus written on it.

In Damascus, the two were brought to a tall building that houses the offices of Jibril’s PFLP – GC. There they met Jihad Ahmed Jibril, the son of Ahmed Jibril. Jihad sent them to train at a military camp located approximately 60 kilometers from the Lebanese border.

For about two weeks, they underwent training at the camp, which included small arms, sabotage, preparing improvised explosives, preparing detonators, operating demolition charges, preparing delay devices, and the production and operation of detonator belts for suicide attacks and mass murder. Upon concluding their training, they returned to the PFLP – GC offices in Damascus.

At the PFLP – GC offices, they were informed about their operational plans, which were to be put into effect upon their return to the “territories.” They enumerated a series of operations they intended to carry out: mortar fire, laying demolition charges, firing upon military reconnaissance patrols, attacking armored IDF personnel carriers and carrying out suicide attacks using a car bomb at Tel-Aviv’s “Azrieli Towers”, thereby killing and injuring a large number of people. The two requested assistance from a PFLP – GC activist in Damascus in carrying out the terrorist attack on the “Azrieli Towers.”

The PFLP – GC activist replied that he would ensure that the two received assistance from Israeli Arabs and that the person in charge of the PFLP – GC in Nablus would supply them with the weapons and explosives for carrying out these acts of terrorism. Prior to their return to the territories, communication arrangements between them and Damascus were established. Their arrest at the Allenby Bridge on August 7, 2001 prevented the carrying out of these terrorist activities.

Bashar’s regime is not satisfied with merely activating Palestinian terror organizations. It also allows the Lebanese Hizballah to operate from Lebanese territory, even after the IDF’s unilateral withdrawal from the “security zone.” Concretely, the Syrians:

Allow the Hizballah to continue to occasionally carry out terrorist attacks from Lebanese territory within parameters that are delimited for them by the Syrian regime. Until now, these terrorist attacks have been concentrated on the Mount Dov district (Shebaa Farms) under false Syrian-Lebanese claims of legitimacy, which are not recognized by the UN, the U.S. or the international community. The latest was carried out on October 3^rd, four days prior to the date on which the Americans began their attack on Afghanistan. It should be pointed out that since IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the Hizballah and Palestinian organizations (supported by the Hizballah) have carried out 12 terrorist attacks, most of them shooting on IDF reconnaissance patrols and positions in the Mount Dov district. Two of them (October 2000) were kidnappings: the kidnapping of three IDF soldiers on Mount Dov and the kidnapping of an Israeli citizen abroad (Elhanan Tanenbaum), who was transferred to Lebanon.
Allow the Hizballah to base its military infrastructure in Lebanon, inter alia, by way of extensive aid and guidance from Iran. The main supply line to the Hizballah is Iranian supply flights that land in Damascus, where combat gear and equipment for the Hizballah are unloaded. The military aid is transferred from Damascus to Lebanon with almost no restrictions or supervision by the Syrian regime. The Iranian assistance, which is permitted by the Syrians, has enabled the Hizballah to expand its arsenal of weapons, which currently include powerful, long range rockets. In this context, it should be pointed out that Syria views the strategic response capabilities of the Hizballah from Lebanese territory (the firing of rockets on northern Israel and into Israel’s territory) as part of creating a strategic “balance of terror” against Israel and as part of its own deterrence. The goal of this deterrence, in the viewpoint of Syria, is to continue enjoying “immunity” while operating the “terror weapon” against Israel.
Prevent the Lebanese government from fulfilling its part of UN Security Council Resolution 425 and from taking steps to restrict Hizballah operations. Within the framework of these policies, the Syrians prevent the Lebanese government from effective deployment of its army along the border with Israel so that the international community won’t ask Lebanon to restrain the Hizballah and restrict acts of terrorism from inside their territory. Syria also takes action to prevent conflicts between the Hizballah and the Lebanese government. This is on the backdrop of criticism from Prime Minister Hariri and other elements in the government concerning obstacles that the existence of the Hizballah’s terrorist infrastructure creates for them in attempting to rehabilitate Lebanon’s economy and conduct relations with the U.S., the UN and Western countries.
Allow the Hizballah to become a factor that is directly or indirectly involved in the Intifadah. The “Hizballah,” who professedly endeavor to eliminate the State of Israel, grant operational and propaganda assistance to Palestinian Islamic terrorist organizations whose aim is to escalate the Intifadah, with the “Islamic Jihad” and Hamas at the center; endeavor to construct a terrorist infrastructure among Israeli Arabs and in the “territories;” encourage provocations with the intention of escalating the Intifadah, such as mortar fire on Israeli settlements in the Gaza strip; they are involved in weapon shipments into the “territories”; they sponsor propaganda for terrorist attacks carried out in Israel and the “territories” by turning the Hizballah TV station (“Al-Manar”) into an important instrument for propaganda that encourages terrorism.

Why does Bashar al-Assad persist in his continued use of terrorist activities carried out by Palestinian terrorist organizations and the Hizballah to promote Syrian interests? Why does he persist in allowing the Hizballah to operate from Lebanon despite the clear risks, which have twice been demonstrated to him when Israel responded to Hizballah operations with attacks on Syrian military targets in Lebanon? Why does Bashar’s regime take on a provocative and defiant political – propaganda line towards the U.S. even after the September 11^th attacks, and even after commencement of the American attack against Bin Laden in Afghanistan?

The answers to these questions are complex. Bashar’s policy may possibly be attributed to just another example of his commitment to his father’s legacy, who was a master of brinkmanship and who throughout his regime, succeeded in activating the “terror weapon” without paying the full price for it; or Bashar’s strong dependence on his father’s entourage; they may also be explained by a lack of political experience and the gap between his lack of charisma as opposed to the strengthening position of terrorist organizations, protégés of Syria, and the Hizballah in particular (Hizballah leader, Sheikh HassanNasrallah, has become a model for imitation in the Arab world and among Palestinians ever since the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon). However, one may assume that at the basis of Bashar the son’s continued use of the “terror weapon” stands a composite of basic goals that are similar to those that motivated his father not to abandon the “terror weapon.”

Having said all the above, we believe that the primary goals behind Bashar al-Assad’s commitment to the continuous use of the “terror weapon” are

To stabilize and strengthen his regime and to safeguard his survival through:

Establishing his personal image as a fierce “national leader” who defends the Arab cause and as someone who does not yield to pressures from external factors (Israel, the U.S. and other Western countries) to restrict terrorist organizations operating in Syria and Lebanon.

Preventing potential shock waves, which are liable to be generated by a change in his father’s policies by resolute action against terrorist organizations. A change such as this would likely be met with fierce resistance by Iran, who is a strategic ally of Syria, and could even awake resentment in the internal Syrian arena.

To establish Syria’s standing as a “key player” both regionally and internationally. Bashar, like his father before him, is well aware of Syria’s military, economic and political weaknesses. Therefore, he views the continued operation of the “terror weapon” as a means to preserve Syria’s standing as a regional “key player” versus the Arab world and the U.S.

To improve Syria’s strategic balance of power vis-à-vis Israel. Terrorism is increasingly perceived by Bashar as the most effective means of pressure that Syria possesses against Israel for achieving its strategic objectives in the distant future, with the return of the Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 lines being at the top of the list.

The former study of terrorism as a preferred instrument of Syrian policy evaluated the consequences of using this “weapon” during the period of Hafez al-Assad’s regime. During the period of Assad the father, from the Syrian point of view, its use helped to attain strategic successes: it aided in establishing the “Syrian order” in Lebanon; it contributed to the internal stability of the Syrian regime (by eliminating its opponents); it constituted an effective tool in Syria’s inter-Arab struggle; it strengthened Syria’s standing in the conflict with Israel and improved its standing vis-à-vis the United States. Even from the Israeli point of view, its damage was strategic in nature: apart from the loss of human life, it contributed to disrupting the peace process both on the Israeli – Palestinian track and the Israeli – Syrian track; it strengthened the extremist Islamic forces while damaging the pragmatic forces in the territories; its use in Lebanon prompted the IDF to unilaterally withdraw from the “security zone” without reaching a political solution and without dismantling the terrorist infrastructures of Hizballah and Iran.

In exchange for the strategic successes the Syrians have gained, they were compelled to pay a political price during the time of Assad the father, and they are still being compelled to pay it during the period of Assad the son: since 1979, they have been included on the American list of countries that sponsor terrorism; their political and economic ties with the U.S. have been damaged due to this; their relations with Arab or Muslim countries have been disrupted on occasion due to their use of the “terror weapon” (Jordan, Turkey). However, when balancing their achievements as opposed to the price, the achievements are perceived as being strategic by the Syrians and the price as “tolerable.” This is because the international community with the U.S. at its center, due to regional political considerations, has looked upon Syria with “tolerance”, refraining from taking resolute action (as it took against Iraq and Libya) to halt the Syrian use of the “terror weapon.” Even Israel has refrained from responding effectively to Syria’s use of the “terror weapon” against it due to Syria’s involvement in the peace process and due to Israel’s focus on the conflict with the Palestinians and their reluctance to take on another “front” against Syria.

This positive balance from Syrian point of view is liable to change in the new era that has begun since Bin Laden’s attacks on New York and Washington, and in light of the long-term campaign that the US has declared against international terrorism and the countries that support it. The next phases of this campaign are likely to involve additional terrorist organizations and countries that sponsor them. The American Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage publicly addressed this topic (“Reuters”, October 11). He declared that Washington is currently focusing on leaders of the “Taliban” and the “al-Qa’ida” organization, but that its next targets would be those attempting to hurt U.S. interests or those of their allies. In response to the question of what is likely to occur if Syria does not act in accordance with the expectation of the United States, Armitage responded that the coalition will do whatever they feel is right, out of a range of possible courses of action: beginning with isolation of the country and taking economic measures against it, and ending with military actions.

In the next stages of the American campaign, Syria will be obliged to reevaluate their policies for the use of the “terror weapon” and to adapt them, if they feel there is a need to, to the new circumstances. In the meantime, they are not in a hurry to do so. Quite the contrary. Encouraged by Syria’s appointment as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Syrians display open contempt for the American declarations, sharply criticize the American attack in Afghanistan, and repudiate on principle the legitimate basis for the American campaign against terrorism. To this end, Bashar’s regime has repeatedly raised the well known claim, from his father’s school of thought, that makes a distinction between “positive” and “negative” terrorism, between what he calls “legitimate resistance to occupation” and terrorism that is not “resistance” (“resistance to occupation”, according to Syrian logic, justifies acts of murder and the killing of citizens – when they serve the goals of the “resistance”).

It should be emphasized that the Syrian distinction between the different types of terrorism is not accepted by the US and their allies in the European community. The American definition views terrorism as violence directed against “noncombatants” while giving broad commentary to this term: citizens and military personnel that are unarmed or not on duty are included in the term “noncombatant” (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2001). This stance provides a legitimate basis for the inclusion of organizations such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizballah on the State Department’s list of “terrorist organizations.” This stance also obligates inclusion of countries such as Syria and Iran on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism, paving the way for dealing with these countries in the future in the framework of the broader targets of the campaign against terrorism.

The Americans have already made public warnings that those regimes that sponsor terrorists will not escape punishment, even if it takes months or years. Armitage’s declaration and the inclusion of Imad Mughniya on the FBI’s “most wanted list” together signal to Syria and Iran that the period in which the use of the “terror weapon” was accepted by the US with a tolerating approach came to an end on September 11, 2001. In order to give meaning to their warnings, during the next phase of the campaign, the Americans will be required to demand that Syria stop aiding the “terrorist organizations,” dismantle the military, political, logistical and propaganda infrastructures of these organizations in Syria and Lebanon, assist in the arraignment of their leaders and activists and adopt a new strategic approach to finding solutions to conflicts through negotiations and dialog and not through terrorism and violence.

When the U.S. and its allies come to adopt this uncompromising approach, the Syrian regime will be faced with a difficult dilemma for the first time in thirty years: to surrender to American and international pressure and to fundamentally alter Syrian policy in a scenario such as this, while attempting to collect the maximum price from the U.S. (in “Israeli currency,” obviously); or to refuse and to take the risk, and for the first time, to pay a heavy price for the policy of using the “terror weapon.” If the Syrian regime does change its policies, a path for renewing the peace talks between Israel and Syria is likely to be paved, and also for finding a solution to a series of problems that are pending between the two countries, including the problem of the Golan Heights. If Bashar refuses, and sticks to using the “terror weapon” in the future, he will lead to international isolation of his country, turning it into a target for various stages of punishment, that will include, inter alia, economic sanctions and military attack operations directed towards destroying the infrastructures of the terrorist organizations in Syria and Lebanon.

Dr. Reuven Erlich is a Research Fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism

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