USCFL - What should the Bush Administration do toward Lebanon?

Lebanon undoubtedly has a long and arduous road ahead of it. Its land is occupied, its government is a tool in the hands of the Syrian intelligence services, its parliament is appointed and not elected, its legal system is rotting with bribery and corruption, its democracy is ceding to autocracy, its economy is in debt beyond all means of repayment and the majority of the population lives on the verge of poverty. In fact Lebanon is a country where the government is completely divorced from the population. These are the plain facts on the ground.

The challenge for U.S. policy makers is to develop a course of action that entails effective and dramatic steps aimed at promoting the eventual de-coupling of Lebanon from Syria. This may be naturally complicated given the difference in the political systems of the two countries, the expansionist—even predatory—ideological disposition of Syria vis-à-vis Lebanon, and the realities on the ground in the latter. Nevertheless, specific practical suggestions for U.S. policy are still possible.

The following are nine suggestions for the Bush Administration that would greatly bolster the resilience of Lebanon's besieged society as it fights for its life against the twin dangers of erosion and assimilation:

1. Work closely with members of Congress and not against them in terms of supporting the Syria Accountability Act of 2002 (H.R.4483.IH), which was introduced in the House by Representatives Dick Armey and Eliot Engel and in the Senate (S.2215.IS) by Senators Barbara Boxer and Rick Santorum. The bills being intended to halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, stop its development of weapons of mass destruction, cease its illegal importation of Iraqi oil, and by so doing hold Syria accountable for its actions in the Middle East.

2. Encourage the gradual growth of a credible, responsible, and free opposition in the Lebanese body politic. This would be an authentic opposition with a solid popular base, acting rationally and responsibly in true democratic fashion according to a national agenda designed to strengthen basic freedoms, openness, and pluralist diversity celebrating distinctive communal identities within the sphere of shared aspirations. Elements of such an opposition currently exist within and beyond Lebanon. They cut across religious divisions and need to be encouraged to emerge gradually on the political scene. Giving the leaders and members of this opposition occasional exposure through meetings with senior American officials would be useful and not hurt anyone.

3. Lend moral and other support to autonomous institutions that fortify Lebanese civil society. These components include the country's market economy, free press, independent judiciary, unions and professional associations (e.g., labor, students, physicians, engineers, lawyers, teachers), the public and private educational sector, women's groups, credible NGOs, and others. Reinforcing Lebanon's societal diversity and initiative (sometimes a mere official public statement would suffice) revives and anchors its dynamic pluralism, which in turn gives it a better chance of outlasting monolithic, authoritarian, and centralized systems. A vibrant civil society is the best antidote to the religious fanaticism and militant extremism that breed terrorism, and the best American investment for the long term.

4. Focus world attention in advance on Lebanon's year 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections in order to help avoid a repetition of the electoral farces since 1992. Four conditions must be satisfied for these elections to yield something approaching fair results. First, All Lebanese abroad who are of legal age and who retain valid passports should be granted the right to vote. Second, all individuals newly naturalized as Lebanese citizens on the basis of the 1994 Naturalization Decree (and any similar decrees subsequently issued by the government and approved by the present parliament) should be barred from voting or running for office for a specific period of time. Third, a provisional government that includes credible representatives of all the main political factions in the country should be formed six months in advance to prepare for and oversee the elections. Finally, impartial international observers should be present to observe the elections. Serious attempts to fulfill these conditions, encouraged judiciously by the United States, would ensure wide popular participation in the upcoming elections.

5. Maintain high-level condemnation of human rights violations perpetrated by the local authorities and/or Syrian forces in Lebanon, and make further aid contingent on tangible improvements in the record. This can be done in cooperation with local and internationally renowned non-governmental human rights organizations. Authoritarian regimes and their surrogates are generally ill-equipped to comprehend the debilitating cumulative effect that recurrent public exposure and condemnation have on their ability to use repression, torture, and brutality as instruments of policy. Exploiting this blind spot can make an imperceptible yet real difference on the ground by giving Lebanon's battered civil society a fighting chance. This approach has been empirically tested and proven effective in Lebanon and communist Eastern Europe, especially when the United States was seen to be genuinely concerned.

6. Build the Lebanese armed forces, not as a tool of government repression; such as is the case today, but as an independent and patriotic institution capable of taking responsibility for security. Through targeted American programs, conditional aid, and restructuring that encourages its patriotic elements, the Lebanese army and related security forces can gradually begin to assume a greater and more effective responsibility for national defense and internal security. A revamped Lebanese army whose reach extends all the way to the international border must include the disarming and disbanding of Hizballah's military wing and other such independent militias. This would also include the removal from Lebanon of all Iranian Revolutionary Guards. On the same note, the United States should not provide Lebanese Armed Forces personnel instruction in combat skills (such as infantry training) as long as its main role is to facilitate Syrian control of Lebanon.

7. Tell the Saudis to stop intervening in Lebanon's internal affairs; whether through Prime Minister Hariri or some other rich merchant such as Prince Waleed bin Talal, and by covertly backing their Syrian brethren financially, morally and otherwise. For too long we have pretended that Saudi Arabia is our fast friend and a key to stability in the Middle East. In truth, it is neither. It's time we leave the fictions to Riyadh, and adjust U.S foreign policy toward both Syria and their sponsor Saudi Arabia accordingly. In fact, covering up on the atrocities of these regimes and treating them like allies of the United States brings us neither more power nor economic prosperity; but only more headache and problems. Americans haven't yet noticed enough that in the Arab world today people are trying constantly to test and push the limits of what is allowed by the regime, by the religious authorities. There's a very strong discussion within the Islamic world on the question of what is modernity,. The old rhetoric is discredited; there is a new language now. Television, foreign publications and the Internet are steadily eroding old isolations. So there is hope if the U.S will ever support peoples initiatives.

8. Redefine and re-structure the Taif Agreement. It is a fact that the Taif agreement initiated a steady process of erosion on more than one level in Lebanon. As the peace process slowly inches forward and the intertwined Syrian and Lebanese tracks stagnate, drift in Lebanon is turning into an imperceptible slide toward a set of irreversible "facts on the ground" intended to promote outright assimilation with Syria; the defacto occupation is gradually becoming de jure annexation. Instead of recognizing and accommodating Lebanon's internal socio-cultural heterogeneity and potentially creative multicultural face, the goal of forced assimilation and homogenization on every level leading to a colorless monoculturalism is being advanced in the name of "national reconciliation" and "national reintegration," and in the ultimate service of Syrian purposes and Ba'th expansionist ideology. The Taif agreement (also referred to as the National Conciliation Document) inaugurated this homogenizing assimilative trend, and the Syrian-appointed regime in Beirut has been reinforcing and accelerating it ever since. Instead of serving as a basis for national reconciliation (as it was initially trumpeted by its supporters), Taif is aggravating latent Christian fears without really satisfying the other communities. The Syrianized Taif in fact is going further by undermining what remains of Christian political influence without fulfilling the aspirations of Lebanon's Muslim political establishment. By curtailing the powers of the presidency—a post traditionally reserved for a Maronite Christian—and rendering it largely ceremonial, and seemingly enhancing the standing of the Sunni prime minister and Shi'a speaker of parliament, Taif is setting the stage for infighting and paralysis among the three key posts referred to euphemistically as the troika Naturally, at times of disagreement and deadlock, the only place to turn for a quick resolution of the impasse is Damascus. Thus Taif is rendering Syria both the maestro and only beneficiary. Taif has to be totally restructured if not dismantled.

9. Appoint a "team" of Lebanese, Americans and Israelis and start building as of today the foundations for a truly warm peace similar to (if not surpassing) that which Israel already enjoys with Jordan. Circumventing preemptive, pseudo-legal restrictions against normalization that are embedded in the numerous bilateral agreements Syria has imposed on Lebanon will be difficult, but not impossible. However, the United States definitely has the wherewithal to impose its will on the respective parties if it so desires. This is the optimal way for Lebanon to get back on its feet, open up to the world and start accessing capital the way it should. It is a fact that an economically thriving Lebanon would pose little threat to either Israel or Syria. Lebanon will never rival, or even compete with, Israel in terms of high-technology; on the contrary, the future portends complementary economic roles. By the same token, the resurrection of Lebanon's traditionally independent and flourishing free enterprise economy is Syria's surest and fastest means to a brighter economic future unshackled by obsolete centralism.

The Syrian government of Bashar Assad remains not only a totalitarian menace to its own people but a threat to any hope that Israel, Lebanon and Jordan might harbor for peace, political freedom and economic opportunity. The United States must come to grips with the reality that the Syrian dictator is not now and can never be a constructive and reliable force for peace in region. Rather than appeasing and cajoling Syria, the U.S. government should be seeking ways to undermine Assad's regime, freeing Lebanon and safeguarding Syria's neighbors from the multifaceted threat that regime will pose as long as it lingers on.

In particular, the United States should do everything it can to ensure that Hizballah is not "legitimized" in Lebanon. Only this country has the resources, both human and technological, needed to monitor and counter the international terrorist cells Hizballah is building beyond Lebanon as a hedge against a future in which that country may no longer be available as a base from which to launch attacks against Israel and its friends. The United States should make use of all such assets to stymie Hizballah's efforts to "go global." And it must insist that Syria move against Hizballah in conjunction with Lebanese forces as a first step toward, at last, its withdrawal from Lebanon and as a precondition to any Syrian rapprochement with Washington.

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Article:	What should the Bush Administration do toward Lebanon?
Author:	Ziad K. Abdelnour -- e-mail: ziad@freelebanon.org
Date:	May 2002